Brainwallet Generator Secure Bitcoin Wallet Generator

"Here’s the Solution to the 3 Year Old, $50,000 Bitcoin Puzzle". How one programmer cracked the private key to a Bitcoin wallet hidden in a painting.

submitted by DanteShamest to programming [link] [comments]

TIL the Large Bitcoin Collider has successfully cracked private keys for multiple bitcoin wallets, despite quantum computing still being decades away.

TIL the Large Bitcoin Collider has successfully cracked private keys for multiple bitcoin wallets, despite quantum computing still being decades away. submitted by twiggers to hacking [link] [comments]

Bitcoin mentioned around Reddit: "Here’s the Solution to the 3 Year Old, $50,000 Bitcoin Puzzle". How one programmer cracked the private key to a Bitcoin wallet hidden in a painting. /r/programming

submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Bitcoin mentioned around Reddit: TIL the Large Bitcoin Collider has successfully cracked private keys for multiple bitcoin wallets, despite quantum computing still being decades away. /r/hacking

Bitcoin mentioned around Reddit: TIL the Large Bitcoin Collider has successfully cracked private keys for multiple bitcoin wallets, despite quantum computing still being decades away. /hacking submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

18 Btc!! Reward for the person who can help find reconstruct a encrypted BIP38 private key passphrase 18 BTC Bounty or a equivalent of US $170K REPOST

I lost my wallet password its BIP38 encrypted Only serious request please I will provide 90% estimated of the password recovered from my brain memory. The reward for the person who can retrieve the full lost pw is 36 BTC. As soon as the lost pw is found i will put the 36 BTC in escrow, or equivalent (us dollars) $360K Its up to the finders choice what he/she wants. PM me for the details encrypted private key i have proof the funds are transferred and stuck since then Old RE:RE:post
Bonus** If found the priv-key within 3a week a bonus of 10btc is added or equivalent in us dollars 460K
*scammers don't put your effort in trying to show me partial of the pub-bitcoin address, claiming you hold the priv-key.
submitted by Bitcoin-headache to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

hodlmon.sh: a UTXO monitoring methodology and script for true connoisseurs of security, paranoia and BTC maximalism

EDIT:
Disclaimer: the below script is provided for example purposes only. You're responsible for your own security. Don't trust, verify.
tldr: the script is literally just an example wrapper to call "gettxout" on your own node via cron to check if your own utxo has been spent yet
OK, since there are a few questions on security below, let me clarify: this script is only for people who are 1) already running their own nodes and 2) can understand the bash script below. And obviously, don't trust some random person on the internet, always verify. I provided this as an example for a way to monitor your own UTXOs with your existing node. Those of you who understand what the below script does will see it's painfully simple and obviously harmless. Those of you who don't understand it, just ignore this post, or better yet, research what the below means until you do understand it. What's important is the idea of monitoring your own UTXO, and this script is an example of how to do that with gettxout.
ORIGINAL POST:
Submitting this to help strengthen the community, and for review:
hodlmon.sh: a UTXO monitoring methodology and script for true connoisseurs of security, paranoia and BTC maximalism
Monitor canary UTXOs for early detection of compromised private keys BEFORE funds are lost, using your own full node for maximum privacy and trustlessness. Note that you will need to implement your own notification strategy (email, push, sms, etc). This script is intended to run on your full node, but can be run from any machine with RPC access to your full node.
hodlmon.sh is designed to check if a given UTXO (i.e. a specific output of a specific btc transaction) has been spent or not. This can be used for early and proactive detection if a seed phrase or private key has been compromised, so you have time to move your btc before full compromise happens. In order for this to work, a small amount of btc should be sent to an address controlled only by a given seedphrase, with that seedphrase being part of a multisig wallet or a seedphrase+passphrase wallet, and the majority of your funds controlled in the seedphrase+passphrase or multisig wallet. The idea is to leave the small amount of btc (the canary utxo) in the address, so that it never moves unless the seedphrase that controls it has been compromised and all funds in the wallet swept. In this way, you use those compromised sats to buy information about the current security status of your wallet(s).
Example usage:Set up a cron job to run hodlmon.sh every 30 min to check if transaction output at index "0" for transaction with id "123" has been spent already. Use "my_utxo_nickname" as a friendly name for the UTXO (to differentiate between multiple wallets)
*/30 * * * * /path/to/hodlmon.sh 123 0 my_utxo_nickname > /tmp/hodlmon_log 2> /tmp/hodlmon_err_log
Usage scenario #1: Seedphrase (A) + passphrase (A')Majority of funds are held in a wallet controlled by both the seedphrase and passphrase, A and A'. A token amount of btc is controlled only by seedphrase A.
A + A': majority of funds
A: canary UTXO
hodlmon.sh is used to monitor the canary funds locked by A, so that if it is discovered that A has been compromised, the funds locked by A and A' can be moved to a new wallet before the passphrase A' can be cracked and all your funds exfiltrated.
Usage scenario #2: multisig e.g. 2 of 3, with seed phrases A, B and CMajority of funds held in a multisig wallet controlled by 3 seedphrases A, B, and C. 3 small canary UTXOs are held in wallets each controlled by A, B or C, respectively.
A + B + C: majority of funds
A: canary UTXO 1
B: canary UTXO 2
C: canary UTXO 3
One benefit of multisig (e.g. 2 of 3) is that even if 1 key is compromised, your funds are safe, since at least 2 keys are needed to release funds. But how do you that none of the keys has yet been compromised? If you create separate wallets controlled each by only 1 of the individual keys, and use hodlmon.sh to monitor whether those UTXOs have been exfiltrated, then you can detect partial compromise of your setup before a full exfiltration event takes place, so you can move your funds to a new multisig wallet with freshly generated and uncompromised keys.
Example of 3 cronjobs to monitor all 3 canary UTXOs:
*/30 * * * * /path/to/hodlmon.sh 123 0 key1 > /tmp/hodlmon_log_1 2> /tmp/hodlmon_err_log_1
*/30 * * * * /path/to/hodlmon.sh 456 0 key2 > /tmp/hodlmon_log_2 2> /tmp/hodlmon_err_log_2
*/30 * * * * /path/to/hodlmon.sh 789 0 key3 > /tmp/hodlmon_log_3 2> /tmp/hodlmon_err_log_3

Example hodlmon script:
#########################################################################
#!/bin/bash
touch /tmp/hodlmon_last_run
echo "Transaction ID: $1"
echo "Output #: $2"
echo "Nickname: $3"
NODE_IP=127.0.0.1 #TODO: use actual value
USER=user#TODO: use actual value
PASS=pass #TODO: use actual value
PORT=8332 #TODO: use actual value
CHECK_CMD="/uslocal/bin/bitcoin-cli -rpcconnect=$NODE_IP -rpcuser=$USER -rpcpassword=$PASS -rpcport=$PORT gettxout $1 $2"
RESULT="$($CHECK_CMD)"
echo "${RESULT}"
if [ "$RESULT" == "" ]
then
echo "UTXO HAS BEEN SPENT! RED ALERT!!"
MSG="The UTXO for $3 from tx $1 output $2 has moved!"
#TODO: ADD YOUR FAVORITE NOTIFICATION STRATEGY E.G. EMAIL, PUSH NOTIFICATION, SMS
else
echo "UTXO is still on ice"
fi
############################################

submitted by facepalm5000 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

The next XVG? Microcap 100x potential actually supported by fundamentals!

What’s up team? I have a hot one for you. XVG returned 12 million percent in 2017 and this one reminds me a lot of it. Here’s why:
Mimblewimble is like Blu-Ray compared to CD-ROM in terms of its ability to compress data on a blockchain. The current BTC chain is 277gb and its capacity is limited because every time you spend a coin, each node needs to validate its history back to when it was mined (this is how double spending is prevented). Mimblewimble is different - all transactions in a block are aggregated and netted out in one giant CoinJoin, and only the current spending needs to be verified. This means that dramatically more transactions can fit into a smaller space, increasing throughput and lowering fees while still retaining the full proof of work game theory of Bitcoin. These blockchains are small enough to run a full node on a cheap smartphone, which enhances the decentralization and censorship resistance of the network.
The biggest benefit, though, is that all transactions are private - the blockchain doesn’t reveal amounts or addresses except to the actual wallet owner. Unlike earlier decoy-based approaches that bloat the chain and can still be data mined (XMR), Mimblewimble leaves no trace in the blockchain, instead storing only the present state of coin ownership.
The first two Mimblewimble coins, Grin and Beam, launched to great fanfare in 2019, quickly reaching over $100m in market cap (since settled down to $22m and $26m respectively). They are good projects but grin has infinite supply and huge never-decreasing emission, and Beam is a corporate moneygrab whose founding investors are counting on you buying for their ROI.
ZEC is valued at $568m today, despite the facts that only 1% of transactions are actually shielded, it has a trusted setup, and generating a confidential transaction takes ~60 seconds on a powerful PC. XMR is a great project but it’s valued at $1.2b (so no 100x) and it uses CryptoNote, which is 2014 tech that relies on a decoy-based approach that could be vulnerable to more powerful computers in the future. Mimblewimble is just a better way to approach privacy because there is simply no data recorded in the blockchain for companies to surveil.
Privacy is not just for darknet markets, porn, money launderers and terrorists. In many countries it’s dangerous to be wealthy, and there are all kinds of problems with having your spending data be out there publicly and permanently for all to see. Namely, companies like Amazon are patenting approaches to identify people with their crypto addresses, “for law enforcement” but also so that, just like credit cards, your spending data can be used to target ads. (A) Coinbase is selling user data to the DEA, IRS, FBI, Secret Service, and who knows who else? (B) What about insurance companies raising your premiums or canceling your policy because they see you buying (legal) cannabis? If your business operates using transparent cryptocurrency, competitors can data mine your customer and supply chain data, and employees can see how much everyone else gets paid. I could go on, but the idea of “I have nothing to hide, so what do I care about privacy?” will increasingly ring hollow as people realize that this money printing will have to be paid by massive tax increases AND that those taxes will be directly debited from their “Central Bank Digital Currency” wallets.
100% privacy for all transactions also eliminates one HUGE problem that people aren’t aware of yet, but they will be: fungibility. Fungibility means that each coin is indistinguishable from any other, just like paper cash. Why is this important? Because of the ever-expanding reach of AML/KYC/KYT (Anti-Money Laundering / Know Your Customer / Know Your Transaction) as regulators cramp down on crypto and banks take over, increasingly coins become “tainted” in various ways. For example, if you withdraw coins to a mixing service like Wasabi or Samourai, you may find your account blocked. (C) The next obvious step is that if you receive coins that these chainalysis services don’t like for whatever reason, you will be completely innocent yet forced to prove that you didn’t know that the coins you bought were up to no good in a past life. 3 days ago, $100k of USDC was frozen. (D) Even smaller coins like LTC now have this problem, because “Chinese Drug Kingpins” used them. (E) I believe that censorable money that can be blocked/frozen isn’t really “your money”.
Epic Cash is a 100% volunteer community project (like XVG and XMR) that had a fair launch in September last year with no ICO and no premine. There are very few projects like this, and it’s a key ingredient in Verge’s success (still at $110m market cap today despite being down 97% since the bubble peak) and why it’s still around. It has a small but super passionate community of “Freemen” who are united by a belief in the sound money economics of Bitcoin Standard emission (21m supply limit and ever-decreasing inflation) and the importance of privacy.
I am super bullish on this coin for the following reasons:
Because it doesn’t have a huge marketing budget in a sea of VC-funded shitcoins, it is as-yet undiscovered, which is why it’s so cheap. There are only 4 Mimblewimble-based currencies on the market: MWC at $162m, BEAM at $26m, GRIN at $22m, and EPIC at $0.4m. This is not financial advice and as always, do your own research, but I’ve been buying this gem for months and will continue to.
This one ticks all the boxes for me, the only real problem is that it’s hard to buy much without causing a huge green candle. Alt season is coming, and coins like this are how your neighbor Chad got his Lambo back in 2017. For 2021, McLaren is a better choice and be sure to pay cash so that it doesn’t get repossessed like Chad!
  1. A https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d35eax/amazon-bitcoin-patent-data-stream-identify-cryptocurrency-for-law-enforcement-government
  2. B https://decrypt.co/31461/coinbase-wants-to-identify-bitcoin-users-for-dea-irs
  3. C https://www.coindesk.com/binance-blockade-of-wasabi-wallet-could-point-to-a-crypto-crack-up
  4. D https://cointelegraph.com/news/centre-freezes-ethereum-address-holding-100k-usdc
  5. E https://www.coindesk.com/us-treasury-blacklists-bitcoin-litecoin-addresses-of-chinese-drug-kingpins
  6. F https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWkTxl5Z6DNN0ASMRxSKV5g
  7. G http://epic.tech/whitepaper
  8. H https://medium.com/epic-cash/epic-cash-on-uniswap-22447904d375
  9. I https://epic.tech/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/figure-3.1.jpg
Links:
submitted by pinchegringo to CryptoMoonShots [link] [comments]

[ Bitcoin ] Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

Topic originally posted in Bitcoin by almkglor [link]
This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given private key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

almkglor your post has been copied because one or more comments in this topic have been removed. This copy will preserve unmoderated topic. If you would like to opt-out, please send a message using [this link].
[deleted comment]
[deleted comment]
[deleted comment]
submitted by anticensor_bot to u/anticensor_bot [link] [comments]

Bitcoin lost password private key, recovery process after 5 years.

Bitcoin lost password private key, recovery process after 5 years.

https://preview.redd.it/a1tgkbr8w0231.jpg?width=4656&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=85f9899eb346a57ec1ea43fec764a39cbd601776
These are private keys I created in 2014, than forgot the password.
I was looking for help in web, someone who could crack it and I found Dave.
https://walletrecoveryservices.com/
Ive sent him details and he manage to crack password really quick, in a week, recovering all my money.
Highly recomended service.
submitted by muciek to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Mentor Monday, September 02, 2019: Ask all your bitcoin questions!

Ask (and answer!) away! Here are the general rules:
And don't forget to check out /BitcoinBeginners
You can sort by new to see the latest questions that may not be answered yet.
submitted by rBitcoinMod to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Microsoft: “Five years from now, we will have a commercial quantum computer" "We are working on a complete quantum system; We are building a complete, end-to-end stack."

Microsoft: “Five years from now, we will have a commercial quantum computer submitted by jhvr001 to Iota [link] [comments]

21 million bitcoins - almost

Found this post by Pieter Wuille on Stack exchange (link provided in comments):
People say the total will be 21000000 BTC. ... however:
The 1st 210000 blocks each allow creating 50 BTC.
The 2nd 210000 blocks each allow creating 25 BTC.
The 3rd 210000 blocks each allow creating 12.5 BTC.
...
The 10th 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.09765625 BTC.
The 11th 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.04882812 BTC, and not 0.048828125 BTC, because only 8 decimals of precision are supported.
...
The 33rd 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.00000001 BTC.
After that, the reward is 0. If you sum all these numbers together, you get 20999999.9769 BTC. ... however, either due to an oversight or intentionally, the coins created in the genesis block cannot be spent. This leaves us with 20999949.9769 BTC. ... however, due to an early problem in Bitcoin, fixed by BIP30, it was possible to create a coinbase transaction identical to a previous coinbase. This caused the coins created by that older coinbase to be irreversibly "overwritten". This happened in block 91842 (overwriting the coinbase of block 91812) and 91880 (overwriting the coinbase of block 91722). Each time, 50 BTC was lost. This leaves us with 20999849.9769 BTC. ... however, the protocol rules allow creating up to the amounts listed above. Due to various bugs and miners experimenting with code, some blocks claim less than allowed. Those coins can never be recovered.
Block 124724 tried to intentionally claim 0.00000001 BTC less than allowed, but accidentally also failed to claim the fees, losing 0.01000001 BTC.
Between block 162705 and block 169899, 193 blocks claimed less than allowed due to a bug, resulting in a total loss of 9.66184623 BTC.
Between block 180324 and block 249185, another 836 blocks claimed less than allowed, resulting in a total loss of 0.52584193 BTC.
Block 501726 had no transaction outputs (except a 0-value commitment), losing the entire 12.5 BTC subsidy.
Block 526591 didn't claim half of the block reward, losing 6.25 BTC.
This leaves us with 20999821.02921183BTC. ... however, since recently there is a concept of provably unspendable coins. Coins can be sent to an "address" which provably burns them (using OP_RETURN). Bitcoin Core tracks these and removes them from its database, so they are easily accounted for. At least 3.71612692 BTC were burned this way. This leaves us with 20999817.31308491BTC (taking everything up to block 528333 into account) ... However, various wallets have been lost or stolen, transactions have been sent to the wrong address, people forgot they owned bitcoin. The totals of this may well be millions. People have tried to tally known losses up here. This leaves us with: ??? BTC.
submitted by ZepCoin to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Possible to guess random other people’s private keys?

I admit, I don’t know nor did I do the math, yet. But the private key is like „only“ 12 words long, and the words sometimes repeat themselves, so there are not too many of them. Since you need nothing else than the private key to take over someone‘s bitcoin wallet, wouldn’t it be possible and „profitable“ to have a computer or many run a software for 24/7 which randomly generates keys, checks if a wallet exists for them, transfers all the btc if so, then repeats this indefinitely?
Probably (I hope) it’s not possible/profitable, but why not? What are the chances? I heard it takes years to crack a single 12-digit password, but since there are thousands upon thousands of bitcoin wallets, I’d presume sooner or later you‘d randomly hit some?
submitted by Reign_of_Light to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Can the owner of 13Yk7NTC64VEfrBL9KE2NNHDrorcJ3SQbz please get in touch with me? I cracked your private key.

I don't really expect this to work, but stranger things have happened. The value in this address is a bit too high for me to believe it's intended as "there for the taking" or anything like that. If it's your address, please move your coins and let me know.
For anyone concerned by my post, the key for this address was created in an extremely uncommon nonstandard way, so there's no need to worry.
Edit: For those who don't know, I'm the guy who talked about brainwallet cracking at DEFCON a year and a half ago. I don't want to touch this person's coins for legal reasons, and I'm not going to elaborate on the nature of this address while it's got a balance. If the reddit post doesn't work for notifying this person I'll try other options.
submitted by rya_nc to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

My Trezor (MEW?) account got compremised, funds were stolen

Hello ladies and gentleman,
I hope you can help me out somehow. I put it in bitcoin as well despite its ethereum but its about trezor and the btc part is involved. In mid september all my ethereum and ethereum based stuff was cleared from my MEW accounts for roughly 38k USD. Trezor couldnt help me at all and we went through all the topics and questions they had which lead to nothing exept an basic answer “your seeds got compromised in the past“, which doesn’t make any sense and I will explain why.
Lets say, Im a person with some basic tech knowledge and worked as admin and I use common sense to handle my crypto stuff which is part of my business and daily task since 2 years.I check all things again before sending. Adress, amount etc and never had any problems before.I never was on a fake page where I had to give my seed or passphrases inI dont open spam mails nor use my new laptop for something else then work, like visiting porn sites or shady stuff or use cracks etc. I didnt even found a malitous cookie after checking everything. The laptop I used was 3 months old and set up on my own with windows, firwall, antivir and anti malware stuff. Things I am doing form me and my friends since year 2000. No cracks used for programms, everything legal. I use a trezor one since then which is updated accordingly when the tool or page prompts me. I used to use chrome as my default browser (which i learned, over the past months trying to figure out what might have happened, is one oft the worst browsers).
No one has my seedsno one knows my pin to entert the trezorI dont store any of this information onlineI dont know my private keys from trezor
So what happened was that september 9 in the evening, a few hours after I sent some usdt deposit to my adress, I want to check if everything is there, login to my MEW account (online, not offline and url was correct. no addon used, just the shortcut in my browser which i safed there and always used and later checked i fit was linked to something else which wasnt), and the account was empty. Three ethereum adresses where i stored some coins, eth and usdt.
I realised that every transaction below happened while i was standing infront of my laptop (checked time happening), trezor connected cause i did some btc transaction before and chatted to customers on different chat tools like telegram or skype. Obvsly without signing any transaction at all everything was sent to other adresses. It seemed someone got the keys to those adresses before. Now, I dont even know my private keys to those adresses which are stored in trezor right? I wasnt logged into MEW before this incident for about 1.5 days. The btc part on my trezor is MUCH more valuable, but still there. After trezor couldnt help me about what happened and MEW treated me like the standard idiot who gets highjacked and then wonders why his money is gone, I went trough so many possibilities. For the most time I thought some kind of KRACK attack happened.
The only problem is trezor says they dont extract the private keys. Some gurus in this topic ( i read on reddit here) say its possible to get them from the network. Even parts are enough to encrypt the whole key after a while which would underline the timeline that it took 6 days from working in this hotel and having the unusual situation with the sending (down explained) till the accs got cleared.
The hotel incident happened the week before my accounts got cleared. I was visitting friends and coworking agents in Vietnam and stayed in a red doorz hotel in Ho Chi Minh. Using the Hotel Wifi and a nvpn.net VPN I sent some usdt funds via MEW to a befriended customer and something very stranged happened, which I never had before.I sent 4k usdt to a customer and the transaction took 13 min working working working and then failed. I’ve never had something like that. We thought it might be because of eth network or so but we never had that before, me and him sending a lot transactions every day.
Then i copied all details in again and send another 4k and somehow he recieved both!
check the screen. The one transaction processed nearly 13 min then failed. 2min later i sent a new one and without any evidence in this screen he recieved both.
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/27e8uyd3.jpg
later
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/3todak3u.png
So he sent me back the additional 4k and I shut down everything not thinking about this much anymore. Only when the accounts got cleared I was searching for any unusual happenings which could have let to this because pretty much all other “typical“ mistakes people normally do we could exclude. If somehow my seeds got compromised why only the ETH stuff? The btc parts on the trezor had much much more value. I never searched for trezor page on the web and used a link to access my wallets or to do updates. I always used the trezor bridge and made a shortcut to my wallet in my browser. For MEW i always used the same shortcut in my browser which worked pretty fine for the past years an everytime when setting the browser or pc new i checked it all before.
Because of the unusual thing which happened in Vietnam I flew back there (from philippines) prepared with tools and checking because I couldnt let go and I didnt find any other plausible cause. I even got back my old room. In this hotel there are three hotel wifi network and I remeber 100% that I used the 2nd one before cause it had the strongest signal. Anyway. I switched on wireshark and later on Fiddler, repeated all steps I used to do before. Checking if some rerouting, dns poisening or readressing or so is happening. Nothing unusual happened in the first when entering MEW (I sent some bait funds there).
In the 2nd network I used in september the trezor basically totally freaked out. He didnt let me enter MEW, I had to reenter my pin up to 5 times sometimes, It gave me error messages in MEW or it took 30 fucking seconds to enter it. Trezor writes about this:
“When you enter an invalid PIN a few times, the Trezor adds a forced waiting time between attempts.You can see this feature on the photo where the Trezor is making you wait for 15 seconds before another attempt.This countdown is then multiplied by the factor of two until you reach the 16th invalid PIN entry. After that, the device automatically wipes its memory - deleting all data from it.
The behavior of your Trezor at MEW is undoubtedly not standard or in any form pleasantly functional. Nevertheless, it also isn't anything superbly unusual or unexpected, taking poor internet connection into account.“
The thing is, the pin is 6 digits but pretty basic and I never ever entered it wrong. And I used the strongest wifi and could open webpages very easily .
As well as: “Sadly, this does not tell us anything about how your funds could be compromised. None of this could have ever exposed your private keys or made your device vulnerable in any way.
The Reddit thread you linked discusses cracking BIP-39 passphrases, which is irrelevant to your case. Cracking such passphrases assumes the person trying to break the wallet already has full possession of the recovery seed (recovery words). See, a passphrase is not your recovery seed or some additional password on your device. It is an extension of the seed, and it is also 100% useless without controlling the full seed.
The only threat you are exposed to when using Chrome is using Google itself. When googling "trezor" or "trezor wallet", you might stumble upon a phishing site which will present itself as a genuine Trezor website and force you to go through a fake "recovery" process. There you'd give out your recovery seed, which subsequently grants full access to your wallet and funds.
It's reasonable to assume that malware could guide you to such a website. To this day, we are not aware of any such incident ever happening, and even then, there are protections in place to defend you against phishing attempts.“
Basically, something I never did and all funds would haven been gone then.
I checked the 3rd network as well, and like the 1st nothing special happened. Only in the 2nd.
These are the funds and how the got cleared off the wallets.
I always show last transaction from me to the adress as well on the screens. So adress:
0x253ABB6d747a9404A007f57AaDEc1cA2b80694a1
They withdrew this:
1k USDT and the small amount ETH to send stuff
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/sg2lumg8.png
adress:
0x01fd43a713D8F46FF9a7Ed108da2FF74884D8400
They withdrew this:Majority of USDT and small eth for sending stuff
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/arycubto.png
adress:
0xf73c8C30072488d932011696436B46005504A7aeThey withdrew this:
Majority of ETh, then all coins from valueable to worthless and then some rest eth
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/urbgm2y5.png
https://s19.directupload.net/images/200121/rdkod59h.jpg
So this is what happened at 12th september between 16:49 and 17:15. Sick to see that all happened between 16:49 and 17:00 and its like someone came back checking and saw the 0.014 eth and withdrew it 17:15. Around 10pm i discovered what happened.
So, do you have any ideas? Questions? Feel free to guess or ask Im glad for everything which might lead to what might have happened. I somehow can’t let go off the feeling something inbetween the network, MEW and trezor ist he cause, but what do I know.
submitted by The_Wave13 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Brainwallet bruteforce challenge (5 BTC bounty)

3 words from the oxford English dictionary plus a number appended to the end. All lowercase.
Wallet: 13D1VNPVyepQWMBPR8XtfQfQ4FJ4qu7DD3 Blockchain link: https://blockchain.info/address/13D1VNPVyepQWMBPR8XtfQfQ4FJ4qu7DD3
Current balance: 6BTC (I've dropped a bunch of hints around the thread, if you're working on a solution you should read them 1st)
Do not put any BTC in the wallet.
submitted by IhavetoomuchBTC to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

15 Btc! Reward for the person who can help find reconstruct a encrypted private key passphrase 15 BTC Bounty or a equivalent of US $10K

I lost my wallet password its BIP38 encrypted Only serious request please I will provide 95% of the password recovered from my memory The reward for the person who can retrieve the full lost pw is 15 BTC. As soon as the lost pw is found i will put the 15 BTC in escrow, or equivalent (us dollars) $10K Its up to the finders choice what he/she wants.
PM me for the details encrypted private key
submitted by Bitcoin-headache to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

NEO WIF and Ledger Nano S

Just purchased a Nano S.
I currently use NEON Wallet and know how it is compatible with the Nano S. From my understanding, previously I have been using my WIF to access my NEON Wallet. But with the Nano S, I only need to select the option on the NEON Menu?
In addition since I will have to send my NEO to the Nano S address, how will I find the new WIF so I can write it down safe?
submitted by Crypto-Rookie to NEO [link] [comments]

Can the owner of 13Yk7NTC64VEfrBL9KE2NNHDrorcJ3SQbz please get in touch with me? I cracked your private key.

I don't really expect this to work, but stranger things have happened. The value in this address is a bit too high for me to believe it's intended as "there for the taking" or anything like that. If it's your address, please move your coins and let me know.
For anyone concerned by my post, the key for this address was created in an extremely uncommon nonstandard way, so there's no need to worry.
Edit: For those who don't know, I'm the guy who talked about brainwallet cracking at DEFCON a year and a half ago. I don't want to touch this person's coins for legal reasons, and I'm not going to elaborate on the nature of this address while it's got a balance. If the reddit post doesn't work for notifying this person I'll try other options.
submitted by rya_nc to btc [link] [comments]

A cautionary tale, back up your password, having the private key is not enough

A cautionary tale, back up your password, having the private key is not enough submitted by toothlessdragonongit to tezos [link] [comments]

Bitcoins.com created by mt.gox

submitted by vhpoet to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Tools - YouTube BITCOIN PRIVATE KEY CRACK TOOL Watch Only Bitcoin Address Proof 2020 Cracking Bip38 Encrypted Private Keys of Bitcoins - YouTube Simplest way to hack Bitcoin Wallet by using private keys ... How to Brute Force a Bitcoin Wallet with Hashcat - YouTube

Private Key Harvesters. Electrum cracker. Brainflayer. Bruteforce Wallet. Large Bitcoin Collider Pool Script # DISCLAIMER. Do not ask questions about how to configure or use the software. I'm not responsible for improper use of the code contained in these repositories. This code has been shared only for security research purpose. Do not ask questions about how to configure or use the software ... Here are some ways that a bitcoin address or wallet may be vulnerable. reactions. A private key is created with a common password such as “123456”.A simple copy/paste mistake. A transaction is created with non-standard outputs. A random number generator was used wrong or produced the same output.The private key was posted publicly. reactions. We are going to be talking about a transaction ... There are random generated Bitcoin private keys, converted into WIF format and hashed to addresses. After getting Bitcoin address we check the quantity of transactions (Tx) and get its balance. If you see any address with transactions, we will store this address into leak database and will try to notify the owner. A Bitcoin Private Key is a secret key which acts a ticket to spend bitcoins. One or more private keys are contained by every Bitcoin Wallet. Every Bitcoin private key is related to all the bitcoin addresses which are generated for the Bitcoin wallet. These keys are very important and should be stored safely. These can be kept safely within the computer files and can be printed on a paper. Form ... How to crack bitcoin private key. There are random generated bitcoin private keys conver! ted into wif format and hashed to addresses. A private key is always mathematically related to the bitcoin wallet address but is impossible to reverse engineer thanks to a strong encryption code base. Or he could actually hack bitcoin exchange and steal all the bitcoins.

[index] [40751] [16330] [43382] [37246] [40124] [19032] [36519] [48193] [22374] [29390]

Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Tools - YouTube

You don't need to know the code, our elves will do all the work for you. Bitcoin Wallet Hack! A program that searches for the private key of a bitcoin! Best ... BITCOIN PRIVATE KEY CRACK TOOL 2020 #Blockchain Exclusive Leak #Private #Key #Hacking #Wallet tool for #BTC you can generate and find private key of BTC address by using the software ... Learn how to Brute-Force your Bitcoin core wallet using Hashcat. Get the Bitcoin2John.py script here: https://github.com/magnumripper/JohnTheRipper/blob/blee... bitcoin key crack bitcoin key creation bitcoin key code bitcoin key derivation bitcoin private key database bitcoin private key database download bitcoin private key database with balance 2018 ... This video is about cracking of BIP38 Encrypted Bitcoins Private Keys. The cracking speed depends on system CPU. (Here used is i5-7200U.

#